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RECENT CASE NOTES
CONTEAIPT OF COURT-PENDING CAsE-October 18, 1924, D published
a criticism of a decision in Batts v. State, 194 Ind. 609, and on January 19,
1926, a report criticising decisions of three other cases, Adonia Dumas v.
State, 197 Ind. 123; Callender v. State, 193 Ind. 91; Flum v. State, 193
Ind. 585. The Dumas case was pending, subject to a petition for rehear-
ing, at time of publication; but the report merely compared that case with
the Federal case, United States v. Borkowski, 268 F. 408, under the head-
ing "Federal and State Supreme Courts Differ," and a statement in the
report that the state court "takes the opposite view." Proceedings in the
other three cases had ended at the time of publication. In its opinion, the
court states that "others (cases of like nature) were still pending," "still
others would be filed in the regular course of events," and that such criti-
cisms would "influence his (a timid judge's) decision improperly in like
cases which were pending or which might be later filed." Held: D guilty
of contempt. State v. Shumaker, August 5, 1927, Supreme Court of In-
diana, 157 N. E. 769. Gemmill and Martin, J. J. dissent.
"Where there is no case pending, by the great weight of authority, there
is no contempt." Willis: Punishment for Contempt of Court, 2 Ind. Law
Jour. 310. A case is pending in a court until there has been a final disposi-
tion of it by that court. 13 C. J. 36; Ex parte Nelson, 251 Mo. 63; State v.
Ingwell, 13 Wash. 238; In re Chadwick, 109 Mich. 588; Ex parte Turner,
3 Mont. D. & DeG. 523; People v. News-Times Co., 35 Colo. 253. Publica-
tions as to past proceedings do not constitute contempt. Cheadle 'V. State,
110 Ind. 300; Zuver v. State, 188 Ind. 60. A publication is a contempt when
it refers "to a matter then pending in court" and tends "to the injury of
pending proceedings upon it and of subsequent proceedings." Cheadle v.
State, supra; Burns' Ann. St. 1926, Sec. 1080; 13 C. J. 34. The comparison
of the Dumas case with the Federal case, United States v. Borkowski, supra,
though the Dumas case was pending, can in no wise, be held contemptuous.
Hence that comment should be disregarded. The other three cases had been
finally disposed of at the time the report was published. If the court
adopted the obsolete English rule, that there can be contempt though no
case is pending, McLeod v. St. Aubyn, L. R. A. C. 549, Willis: Punishment
for Contempt of Court, 2 Ind. Law Jour. 310, then it reversed its own rule
as stated in Cheadle v. State, supra; Zuver v. State, supra. But the court
cites Cheadle v. State in support of its power to punish for contempt; so
evidently no such change was intended. Thus, it seems the court has adopted
a rule that it can punish for contempt when any like case is pending or
may later be filed. If this rule obtains, does it not follow that there can
never be criticism of any case? No murder case can be criticised because
other murder cases are pending or may be filed next week. No property
case can be criticised because there will always be other property cases
before the court. No case, finally disposed of, can be discussed because
another case, not mentioned in the discussion, but of like nature, is pending,
or is to be fied next year. Under such a rule, there would always be cases
"pending," and no case would ever be subject to criticism.
B. B. C.
JUDGMENT-TAx Dnnm-Complaint by appellant to enjoin the sale of
realty to satisfy an assessment lien for sewer and street improvement al-
leged: that the realty was sold to appellant for delinquent taxes; that the
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property was not redeemed within two years of the date of sale; that subse-
quently appellant received a tax sale deed to the property from the county
auditor; that appellant quieted her title to the property against all the
world, having made certain named persons, not including the bondholder or
contractor, defendants to that suit; and that the county treasuier now
threatens to sell the realty to satisfy the assessment lien. Appellee, bond-
holder's demurrer was sustained, and appellant refusing to plead further,
judgment was taken against her. Appellant assigned error. Held: Alle-
gation that appellant quieted her title against all the world was of no avail
where defendant had not been made a party defendant in the suit to quiet
title. Judgment affirmed. Grieger v. Carlson, County Treasurer et al.
Appellate Court of Indiana, July 1, 1927, 157 N. E. 443.
The opinion of the case reviewed does not discuss the interest appellant
gained in the land by the tax deed. "A tax deed . . . vests in the grantee
an absolute estate in fee simple, subject, however, to all the claims which
the state may have thereon for taxes or liens or encumbrances." Sec.
14325 Burns' 1926. Many cases tend to show that the interest conveyed is
subject to other encumbrances. "The lien of assessment was not destroyed
by the tax sale. The section of the statute which declares that a tax deed
'shall vest in the grantee an absolute estate in fee simple' defines the quality
of the estate, and does not release it from valid encumbrances." City of
Indianapolis v. City Bond Co., 42 Ind. App. 470. The case of McCollum
et al v. Uhl, 128 Ind. 304, and Justice v. City of Logansport, 101 Ind. 326,
hold that tax deeds do not divest liens for special assessments and municipal
taxes. The more recent decision of Ellison P. Branstrattor, 45 Ind. App.
307, while not repudiating the former decisions, seems flatly contra, holding
that a tax lien was superior to a ditch assessment lien, and that the tax
deed vested in the grantee an absolute fee simple, subject only to state
claims extinguishing the assessment lien which was not a lien of the state.
The case is not cited on this point as authority in later cases, and the opin-
ion of the case reviewed, while not discussing the point, reaches the result
found in the case of Indianapolis v. City Bond Go. cited above.
The remaining point to be considered is the effect of the judgment, in
appellant's suit to quiet title, upon persons not made parties to the suit.
The statute is explicit that all parties who appear of record in any of the
public officers of the county where the realty is situated shall be made
defendants. Sec. 14340, Burns' 1926. The cases are unanimous in hold-
ing that failure to make such interested persons defendants to the suit is
fatal to the decree "against all the world." Bastin v. Myers, 144 N. E.
425; Hutchinson v. Wood, 59 Ind. App. 537. Such persons have the same
right subsequent to the suit that they had prior to it.
M. R. H.
RAMLROADS--PRXIMATE CAUS-CONTRIBUTORY NFAGIGr-NcE.-Appellant
operated an electric train which collided with an auto truck driven by appel-
lee's decedent. The appellee gave evidence showing that the train was being
operated at a high and dangerous rate of speed under the circumstances.
Appellant gave evidence showing that the decedent's own negligence con-
tributed to his injury and death; tfhat the immediate collision did not injure
either the truck nor the decedent, but did cause the brake mechanism on
the train to become inoperative; that the truck was pushed some distance
ahead of the train before it overturned causing the injury and death of the
decedent. The lower court gave instructions authorizing recovery for the
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death of the decedent if the defendant was first negligent in driving the
train at a high rate of speed and if decedent was not negligent after the
collision and before the injury. Held: Instructions erroneous and case
reversed. Union Traction Co. v. Ringer, Supreme Court of Indiana, April
7, 1927. 155 N. E. 826.
Contributory negligence in an action for damages brought on account of
negligence of another for personal injuries is a matter of defense. Burns'
Ann St., Sec. 380. Indianapolis Street Ry. Co. v. Taiflor, 158 Ind. 274.
But contributory negligence will not bar recovery if the other party being
negligent fails to use care to avoid injury after discovering the peril. Terre
Haute Traction Co. v. Stevenson, 189 Ind. 100. Southern R. R. v. Wahl,
196 Ind. 581.
The instructions of lower court did not consider that the collision caused
partly by the decedent's own negligence so disabled the car as to make
further care on the part of the motorman to no avail. Where there is
mutual negligence one cannot recover if the other after discovering the
peril cannot by reasonable care and skill avoid injury. Indianapolis and
Cincinnati R. R. Co. v. Wright, 22 Ind. 376. Contributory negligence to be
a defense must also proximately contribute to the injury. Cromer v. City
of Logansport, 38 Ind. App. 661; Abney v. Indiana Union Traction Co., 41
Ind. 53. While the defendant's negligence was contemporaneous with that
of decedent, both negligent acts ceased at the same time though the effect
of one may have persisted longer than the other. Hence this is not within
the doctrine of antecedent and subsequent negligence as declared in Indian-
apolis Traction Co. v. Croly, 54 Ind. App. 566. If one party is negligent,
he can recover from the other only if the other's negligence is the proximate
cause and his own negligence is not the proximate cause because it has
ceased entirely before the injury. Union Traction Co. v. Vatchet, 191
Ind. 324.
C. W. D.
SEARCH WARRANT-AFFIDAVIT THEREFOR-PROBABLE CAUSE.-D. appeals
from a conviction for possessing a still for the purpose of unlawfully manu-
facturing intoxicating liquors. The desk sergeant of the police department,
who was the affiant, testified that there had been much complaint about
D.'s running a still in the basement of his bakery, that he, the affiant,
walked past the bakery and smelled an odor like "swill," that he had never
smelled liquor being made buV that the odor was the same as that of fer-
mented bran used to feed hogs. He thereupon made affidavit stating that
he "has reason to believe and does believe that James Wallace has in his
possession intoxicating liquor," etc. No facts were set forth in the affidavit.
The search warrant was issued, and a great lot of intoxicating liquor, mash,
and equipment for making liquor was found. D.'s motion to quash the
search warrant, the return thereon, the affidavit for the warrant, and all
the evidence of the finding and seizure was overruled, and D. was convicted.
The case comes up on error. Held (Martin and Gemmill, JJ., dissenting):
The existence of probable cause for a search warrant is for judicial and
not ministerial determination. A search warrant issued on mere belief or
information and belief is insufficient for finding of probable cause. Wallace
v. State, Supreme Court of Indiana, June 30, 1927, 157 N. E. 657.
The court obviously thinks that the legislature usurped judicial powers
in enacting the statute regulating issuance of search warrants, Burns'
(1926) 2746, and affidavit therefor, Burns' (1926) 2086, in that the statute
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
stops short of probable cause in allowing the affidavit to state only that
affiant "believes, and has good cause to believe." The opinion says: "It is
not within its (the legislature's) province to say to any judicial officer that,
when he has heard proof of certain facts, the evidence thus adduced before
him shall constitute conclusive proof of the fact in issue in the trial
before him." Concerning statutes providing for issuance of warrants upon
affidavits that affiant "has cause to believe and does believe," etc., a recent
text writer says: "By the great weight of authority all such legislation
has been held to be unconstitutional as violative of the Fourth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution and similar state constitutional provisions."
Cornelius: Search and Seizure, page 81. A statutory provision which au-
thorized the issuance of a warrant upon an affidavit which stated that the
affiant "has reason to believe, and does believe," etc., was held unconsti-
tutional because it required nothing except the belief of the affiant, and
not the setting forth of facts to satisfy the magistrate that there was prob-
able cause. People v. De La Mater, 213 Mich. 167; Lippman v. People,
175 Ill. 101; Ripper v. United States, 178 Fed. 24. California and New
York require written depositions of facts before a warrant can be issued,
Ex parte Demmig, 74 Cal. 164, People v. Maniscalco, 199 N. Y. S. 444; but
in those states the setting forth of facts is required by statute, Deering
Penal Code of California (1923), sections 1526, 1527, 1528, and N. Y. Code
of Crim. Proc., section 8026. One of the principal cases relied on by the
dissenting opinion in Wallace v. State is Rose v. State, 171 Ind. 662, which
has never been overruled and which held that an affidavit for a search
warrant upon information and belief was within the constitution. The
majority opinion attempts to distinguish the two cases by saying that Rose
v. State was a proceeding in rem, but does not explain why a citizen requires
less protection against search and seizure in a proceeding in rem than he
does in any other proceeding. The whole question seems to be: Against
what kind of search and seizure were the makers of the State Constitu-
tion and of the Federal Constitution trying to protect citizens? The decision
of Wallace v. State holds that ft was against search and seizure without
previous judicial determination of probable cause from facts shown. Query,
if it is not also judicial determination for the magistrate to issue the war-
rant upon consideration of the character and integrity of the officer making
affidavit? The dissenting opinion says the constitutional provision was
aimed to protect against general warrants and writs of assistance, and
cites a great amount of authority in support of that position.
D. J.
